Can free relatives be concealed questions in Classical Greek ? by Faure, Richard
Can free relatives be concealed questions in Classical
Greek ?
Richard Faure
To cite this version:
Richard Faure. Can free relatives be concealed questions in Classical Greek ?. 9th International
Conference on Greek Linguistics, Oct 2009, Chicago, Illinois, United States. <hal-00469831v2>
HAL Id: hal-00469831
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00469831v2
Submitted on 18 Jul 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 Can Free Relatives be Concealed 
Questions in Classical Greek ? 
Richard Faure (Université Paris-Sorbonne). 
faurerichard5044@neuf.fr 
 
Abstract 
In this paper I address the issue as to why there are at first glance three items that 
can introduce an embedded question in Classical Greek: hós (relative), tís 
((direct) interrogative) and hóstis (so-called indefinite relative). Though, a closer 
examination shows that this threefold possibility is limited to the set of responsive 
question-embedding predicates. Moreover, tís patterns with hóstis in that both 
can also be used after rogative predicates. Therefore the distinction is amenable 
to a binary one. Giannakidou’s 1998 notion of non-veridicality accounts for it: tís 
and hóstis prove to be licensed by non veridical contexts. Hós clauses are nothing 
else than actual Free Relative clauses, that function as concealed questions, or, 
better said, as concealed propositions. To explain this, I resort to Jacobson’s 
(1995) theory of Free Relatives and to a type-shifting operation, already called 
for in Nathan (2005). 
1 Introduction: too many indirect questions? 
Embedded questions are distinct from Free Relatives in that the selection of the 
embedding verb and of the embedded verb need not be the same. In [1], eat and 
cook both take a concrete object as complement (see [2] and [3]). Therefore, in [1] 
what I cooked is an instance of Free Relative. On the other hand, [4], where know 
and cook have a different selection (see [5] and [6]), is an instance of embedded 
question. Question embedding predicates, as know is, must be somehow 
predicates of propositional attitude. 
 
[1] You ate what I cooked. 
[2] You ate a cake. 
[3] I cooked a cake. 
[4] You know what I cooked. 
[5] I cooked a cake. 
[6] *You know a cake. 
 
If we now turn to the data of Classical Greek, it appears that specific issues 
arise. But before proceeding to the analysis of the relevant data, some background 
on Classical Greek is needed.  
Contrary to most modern occidental Indo-european languages, Classical 
Greek has two distinct paradigms for relative and interrogative items. This is 
obvious from the examples [7] and [8] providing a restrictive relative with a term 
 of the hós paradigm and a direct interrogative. Note also that Classical Greek has 
Free Relatives introduced by exactly the same item as restrictive relative clauses1. 
 
[7] Mοι τὸν νόµον αὐτὸν ἀνάγνωθι ὃς κελεύει 
 Moi2 tòn nómon autòn anágnōthi hòs keleúei 
 to-me the law itself read-IMP3 rel-nom order-PRS.3SG 
        
 τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἐξεῖναι διαθέσθαι ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ. 4,5 
 tà heautoũ exeĩnai diathésthai hópōs án ethélē 
 the himself-GEN be-allowed set as ptc want-SUBJ.3SG 
‘Read me the law that orders that a man can dispose of his property as he likes.’ 
 
[8] Τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται;6 
 
Tís agoreúein boúletai 
 int-NOM speak want-PRS.3SG 
‘Who wants to speak?’ 
   
So far, everything is clear, but the picture gets blurred when it comes to 
embedded questions. We would like to draw attention on a phenomenon remained 
unexplained up to now in Classical Greek and exemplified by [9], [10] and [11]. 
 
[9] Ταῦτα ἔλεγεν εἰδὼς ἃ Τιµασίωνι ὑπισχνοῦντο.7 
 
Taũta élegen eidṓs há Timasíōni hupiskhnoῦto 
 dem-ACC.N.PL say-PST.3SG knowing rel-ACC.N.PL T-DAT promise-PST.3PL 
‘Theyi said so, knowing what theyj had promised to Timasion.’ 
 
[10] Οὐχ ἡγεῖ γιγνώσκειν αὐτοὺς ὅστις εἶ;8 
 
Oukh hēgeĩ gignṓskein autoùs hóstis eĩ 
 neg think-PRS.2SG know-INF them-ACC hóstis-NOM be-PRS2SG 
‘Don't you think that they know who you are?’ 
 
                                                 
1
 Contrary to most languages. See Caponigro (2003) for an overview. Note also that they do 
not have the same semantics as that usually assumed for Free Relatives, but this a another topic. 
2
 We transliterate from the Greek into the Latin alphabet. /, \ and ~ are three different 
accents. 
3
 When relevant, we use the Leipzig glossing rules
 (http://www.eva.mpg.de/lingua/resources/glossing-rules.php). 
4
 As Ancient Greek is not spoken anymore, I work on a corpus which is made up of 
Aristophanes’ plays, Xenophon’s Anabasis and Cyropaedia, Plato’s Republic, Protagoras and 
Gorgias, and Desmosthenes’ Orationes. 
5
 Isaeus, 2, 13. 
6
 Aristophanes, Acharnenses, 45. 
7
 Xenophon, Anabasis, 5, 6, 26. 
8
 Demosthenes, 18, 283. 
 [11] Ἴσως οὔπω οἶσθα τί λέγω.9 
 
Ísōs oúpō oĩstha tí légō 
 maybe not yet know-PRS.2SG int-ACC.N say-PRS.1SG 
‘You may not know yet what I mean.’ 
 
In [9], [10] and [11] three different items are employed. In [9], há belongs to 
the paradigm of the relative hós ; in [11], tís is the item that is also used in direct 
question ; in [10], hóstis is also a relative pronoun, whose meaning of which is 
close to ‘whoever’. 
According to the selectional criterion just mentioned, [9], [10] and[11] are 
three instances of embedded questions. Moreover, it is noteworthy that they are 
translated and interpreted as such in English. Hence, we expect them to begin 
with a word of the tís-paradigm. Surprisingly, two of them do not [9] and [10]. [9] 
is introduced by a word of the hós (so called relative) paradigm. Embedded 
interrogatives can even begin with a third type of item hóstis [10] which we leave 
aside in this paper. Suffice it to say that it behaves the same way as tís in this 
environment. 
This article shall rather focus on tís vs hós embedded questions10 and their 
apparent neutralization. We shall argue that their uses can be distinguished both 
on syntactic and semantic criteria. 
 
 
To begin with, we show that not every class of question embedding verbs 
selects for both types of clauses. Only the so-called responsive class can have as a 
complement a relative. 
Then, we attempt to account for the distribution along the lines of 
Giannakidou’s analysis of PIs licensing in terms of (non)veridicality. At the cost 
of slight changes, I show that the notion makes the right predictions: hós is only 
licensed in veridical contexts. 
Finally, we turn to a more theoretical part and address the issue as to why 
relative clauses are used in such a context. As a matter of fact, we do not need to 
assume that they are questions, given that nothing triggers an interrogative 
interpretation. Rather they denote propositions. Paralleling the mecanism of 
concealed questions, we propose the concept of concealed proposition, possibly 
extendible to other abstract objects. The relative clauses under examination would 
undergo a double process of type-shifting (Jacobson 1995) and then type-coercion 
(Pustejovsky 1993), lifting them to the right type. 
As far as the interpretation is concerned, we are facing a case of information 
retrieval. In the case of interrogatives, information cannot be retrieved from the 
context, that is the process of identification fails. With a relative, the information 
                                                 
9
 Plato, Gorgias, 500a. 
10
 Drawing on their prototypical uses, we shall call them interrogatives (tís) and relatives 
(hós) for the sake of simplicity. 
 is retrievable from the context. Hence we propose to amend Groenendijk & 
Stokhof semantics for questions: responsive predicates can embed the intension of 
a question in suitable (non veridical) contexts. 
2 Hós clauses show up after responsive predicates 
According to Lahiri (2002) among others, question embedding predicates 
distribute over two classes: the responsive class and the rogative class. The 
responsive predicates such as know, remember, learn etc (οĩδα, mémnēmai, 
manthánō...) embed interrogatives that denote the answer (or the response) to the 
question, while rogative predicates embed question denoting interrogatives. 
 
If you look at the distribution of hós clauses, it turns out that not every 
question embedding predicates embed them, as you can see in example [9] where 
a verb ‘know’ is used. Hós clauses are in fact limited to the class of responsive 
predicates. Note that perception and surprise verbs are used in this way as well. 
This is not only a matter of lexical semantics or of quantification variability 
effect sensitivity (a problem that is controversial). In Classical Greek, these verbs 
have the same syntactic selectional properties. They are the only ones that select 
for a hóti/hōs clause or a participle clause at the accusative. We can predict that if 
a verb has these selectional properties, it will embed interrogative or relative 
clauses with a so-called interrogative interpretation, which is borne out. 
Semantically, it corresponds to the class of cognitive factive verbs, extended 
to a short subset of strong assertive predicates in Hooper’s (1975) sense. 
 
After such verbs, the interrogative clause is taken to denote the answer, the 
extension of the question, in Groenendijk and Stokhof’s (1982; 1989) terms. This 
is not surprising at all if you look at the short dialog provided under [12].  
 
[12] A: οὗτός ἐστι τίς; 
 
 Hoũtós esti tís 
  dem-NOM.M.SG is int-NOM 
 
B: ὃς τοῖς νεκροῖσι ζωγραφεῖ τὰς ληκύθους.11 
 
 hòs toĩs nekroĩsi zōgrafeĩ tàs lēkúthous 
  rel-NOM the dead-DAT.PL paint-PRS.3SG the vases 
‘A: This man, who is he ? 
B: (the man) who paints the vases for the dead.’ 
 
A poses his question with tís, and B answers it with a hós relative clause. 
What is crucial here is that it is a Free Relative. This is a very large phenomenon. 
It is then not surprising that hós be used after responsive predicates. 
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 Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae, 995. 
 We end up with a nice picture and a one-to-one correspondence between 
relatives and responsive predicates. The inference would be that rogative 
predicates should embed only interrogatives, which is borne out.  
Nonetheless, the opposite is not true. Not every (tís) interrogative is 
embedded under a rogative predicate. What to do with cases such as [11], which 
contains both a responsive predicate and a tís interrogative ? Is there a free 
variation between hós and tís after these predicates ? Our claim is that this is not 
the case. 
3 Responsive predicates in (non)veridical environments 
It has already been noticed that nonveridicality may have something to do with 
wh-selection. It was in den Dikken & Giannakidou (2002) about wh- the hell 
clauses. Look at [13] through [16] (their [5] and [6]). Wh- the hell clauses are 
licensed under a negative operator [16], but not in a positive context [14]. In this 
paper, they show that negative context can be extended to all nonveridical 
contexts as defined in Giannakidou (1998) or (2002), and repeated here under 
[17]. 
 
[13] I know who would buy that book. 
[14] * I know who the hell would buy that book. 
[15] I don’t know who would buy that book. 
[16] I don’t know who the hell would buy that book. 
 
[17] (Non)veridicality for propositional operators 
A propositional operator F is veridical iff Fp entails p: Fp  p; 
Otherwise F is nonveridical. 
 
Now, if we go back to the example [11], it turns out that ἴσως ‘maybe’ and 
οὔπω ‘not yet’ are nonveridical as proved by English examples [18] and [19]. I 
assume that, at least for these operators, the entailment holds universally and 
carries over to Classical Greek. Therefore, their combination is not veridical 
either. 
 
[18] Maybe he left -/ He left. 
[19] He didn’t left yet -/ He left. 
 
Nonveridicality might be the condition for tís clauses to show up. Before 
exploring the other nonveridical environments in Classical Greek, a caveat is in 
order. 
3.1 Factivity vs nonveridicality 
Recall that we mention that the predicates in question were cognitive factive 
predicates. Therefore they must, even under negation and weaker nonveridical 
operators, presuppose the truth of their complement and the entailment blocked in 
 [18] and [19] should be felicitous with a factive predicate, which proves to be 
correct (see the entailments [20] and [21]). 
 
[20] Maybe Peter knows that Anna left  Anna left 
[21] Peter does not know yet that Anna left  Anna left 
 
Nonetheless, it is not necessarily the case as proved in Karttunen (1971), 
perceptible in Hajičová’s (1973) seminal work on allegation, and fleshed out in 
Beaver (2010) and Faure (2006). (At least) two interpretations of [22] and [23] are 
available, depending upon the focus structure. In [24] and [25], the proposition 
expressed by the that-clause is clearly presupposed, but in [26] and [27] 
judgments are much more fuzzy and tend to deny the that-clause the status ‘true’. 
It becomes evident with dynamic predicates such as discover that the 
presupposition is lost under such conditions. 
 
[22] Maybe you know that his wife has an affair with his boss. 
[23] You don’t know yet that his wife has an affair with his boss. 
 
[24] Maybe you [know]
 FOC that his wife has an affair with his boss. 
[25] You [don’t know]
 FOC yet that his wife has an affair with his boss. 
 
[26] Maybe you know [that his wife has an affair with his boss]FOC. 
[27] You don’t know yet [that his wife has an affair with his boss]
 FOC. 
 
The weakness of the presupposition after cognitive factive predicates 
accounts for the distribution of hós vs tís clauses. 
3.2 Distribution 
We need to check whether all nonveridical contexts provided in Giannakidou’s 
works are the environments where tís shows up.12 The hypothesis is borne out for 
all the contexts that are present in my corpus. We will not give an example of 
each, but [28] is a list of such contexts and the examples [29] and [30] display two 
nonveridical environments: before-clauses and deontic modality.13 
 
[28] Negations; before-clauses; Questions; Conditionals (antecedent of conditionals); 
Futures; Modalities (necessity, possibility, ability, willingness); Imperatives (and other 
injonctive contexts such as deliberation); Ἴσως ‘maybe’; Intrinsecally negative verb 
(ἀπορῶ ‘not-know’); Generics.14 
 
                                                 
12
 For a list see Giannakidou (1998 passim, but especially table 3 on p. 89) or (2002: 34-40). 
13
 Recall that hóstis (and its paradigm) is merely a variant of tís, as shown by [32]. Look also 
at sentences [10] and [11]. 
14
 Expected contexts that do not show up in my corpus are without-clauses; restriction of ∀; 
too-clauses; S-comparatives; superlatives; habituals; disjunctions; downward-entailing DP. 
 (I won’t answer your question) 
[29] πρὶν ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωµαι ὅ τι ἐστίν.15 
 prìn àn prṓton apokrínōmai hóti estín 
 before ptc first answer-SBJV.PRS.1SG ὅστις-ACC.N is 
‘before I have answered (the question) what (the rhetoric) is.’ 
 
[30] Ὅ τι δύναται ταῦτα ποιεῖν, 
 
Hó ti dúnatai taũta poieĩn 
 
ὅστις-ACC.N can-PRS.3SG this do-INF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ἐνίους µαθεῖν ὑµῶν δεῖ.16 
 
eníous matheĩn humn deĩ 
 some learn-INF  of-you must 
‘Some of you ought to be told the possible result of all this.’ 
 
The exceptions can easily be accounted for by showing that when a hós 
clause occurs along with a nonveridical operator, it is not in its scope [31]. This 
has something to do with D-linking, as we will see in a moment. On the other 
hand, when no nonveridical operator is present, the tís clause can only occur if it 
is focused [32]. 
 
[31] Εἰ ἃ συµφέρει [χωρὶς   κολακείας]FOC 
 
Ei hà sumférei khōrìs kolakeías 
 if rel-ACC.N.PL be.useful-PRS  without flattery 
 
ἐθελήσετ’ ἀκούειν, ἕτοιµος λέγειν.17 
 
ethelḗset’ akoúein hétoimos légein 
 want-FUT.2PL hear-INF ready-NOM.M.SG speak-INF 
 ‘If, apart from flattery, you are willing to hear something to your advantage, I 
am ready to speak.’ 
 
[32] Συµβουλευόµεθά σοι [τί χρὴ ποιεῖν περὶ ὧν 
 
Sumbouleuómethá soi tí khrḕ poieĩn peri hn 
 take.advice-PRS.1PL from-you int-ACC.N must do-INF about rel-GÉN.N.PL 
 
      
 
λέγεις]FOC Σὺ οὖν πρὸς θεῶν συµβούλευσον 
 
légeis Sù oũn pròs then sumboúleuson 
 say-PRS.2SG you then in.the.name gods advice-IMP 
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 Plato, Gorgias, 463c. 
16
 Demosthenes, 8, 24. 
17
 Demosthenes, 9, 4. 
  
      
 
ἡµῖν [ὅ τι σοι δοκεῖ ἄριστον εἶναι].18 
 
hēmn hó ti soi dokeĩ áriston eĩnai 
 to-us ὅστις-ACC.N to-you seem-PRS.3SG best be-INF 
‘We ask you to advise us as to what we ought to do about the matter you 
mention. So in the name of Gods, give us an advice about what you think is the best.’ 
 
These two phenomena ((non)scope of a nonveridical operator, focus) are 
coherent. As [29] through [32] show, a tís clause shows up only if the operator 
bears on it. Otherwise, hós clauses are used. On the other hand, tís clauses also 
show up when in the scope of the focus. What do focus and nonveridical 
operators have in common ? To put it informally, both involve a process of 
selection over a set of propositions (Rooth (1992) for the focus). 
What remains to explore is to what extent the scope effect of a nonveridical 
operator is amenable to a focus effect. As this issue goes far beyond the scope of 
this paper, we shall leave it aside here. 
 
Finally, one last context should be possible, even if absent of my corpus. It 
can be exemplified with the English sentence in [33]. 
 
[33] [I]F know if she came. 
 
For a speaker to accept this sentence, the if-clause must have an echo flavor. 
For example in the scenario where someone must have asked the question before, 
and the listeners replied that they did not have the answer. In this case, someone 
that has remained silent, can come up and say [33] with a stress on the pronoun. 
In [34], the French version of [33], the strong pronoun moi pops up. And even in 
these contexts, I have been reported that some speakers were reluctant to accept 
the sentence (a positive sentence with if is felt to be contradictory). 
 
[34] Moi, je SAIS si elle est venue. 
 IEMPHASIS I know whether she came 
 
Tís clauses may be able to show up in these contexts where it is not directly 
involved in the focalization, because of the echo use of the question. In this case, 
it would be close to a mere quotation of a previous direct question, a use that must 
be neatly separate from the previous two. 
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 Xenophon, Anabasis, 2, 1, 17. 
 4 Interpretation 
4.1 Composition between cognitive factive predicates and hós 
clauses 
Now we know what are the licensing conditions for tís clauses, the licensing 
conditions for hós clauses are deducible: they must outscope nonveridical 
operators, if any is present and be outside the focus, that is they must be somehow 
topic.  If we combine these results with what we notice in section 2 (only 
responsive (factive) predicates embed hós clauses), we are left with the cases 
where the clause is not focus under responsive predicates, that is where 
presuppositions are not cancelled (see 3.1). hós clauses are hence 
presuppositional. 
 
But this does not give us the interpretative difference between tís and hós 
clauses. The rest of this paper is devoted to sketch an explanation for why hós 
clauses can occur in these environments, and what their interpretation is. 
As verbs of propositional attitude, cognitive factive predicates select for a 
proposition rather than a question. They are of type <<s, t>, <e, t>>. It seems 
therefore more natural to attempt to account for the hós clauses through this 
selectional property than handle it with the semantics of questions. 
As aforementioned, hós clauses are presuppositional, have large scope and 
are most often topic. The conclusion is then that with a hós clause the information 
is retrievable from the context, whereas with a tís clause, it needs external input 
(that is why this is the only type of clauses used with a rogative verb). 
Both requirements (that the complement responsive predicates be a 
proposition and that hós clauses involve identification) are met in Groenendijk & 
Stokhof’s (1982; 1989) semantics for interrogative clauses after “extensional” 
predicates, illustrated by [36], the formal translation of [35]. It simply means that 
after know, the set of worlds w’ (the proposition) involving an underspecified 
variable x is assessed against the world as it is w. This implies that the content of 
the variable x is not expressed, but retrieved from the context. 
 
[35] John knows who walks. 
 
[36] know* (w) (j, λw’ [λx walk (w) (x) = λx walk (w’) (x)]) 
w and w’ possible worlds, j a constant, and x a variable. 
 
The modification in order is to say that we need not, at least for Classical 
Greek, postulate that ‘who walks’ is an interrogative. Rather, it is easily handled if 
taken as what it looks like, namely a relative. The consequence is that we do not 
have to construe a bridge between relative and interrogative clauses. Each is 
understood independently. 
 
 But now we have a problem with tís clauses. Indeed, tís clauses are questions 
as shown by their usages in direct questions and with rogative predicates. In 
Groenendijk and Stokhof semantics for questions, a question is a propositional 
concept of type <s <s, t>>. If know selects for a proposition, combining it with a 
tís clause results in a type-mismatch. 
The partitioning effect of both the focus and the non veridical operators 
alleged in section 3.2 might be involved in an explanation. In this case, a 
semantics for questions à la Hamblin-Karttunen (questions as set of propositions) 
would be more suitable. Since our aim is to give a whole account of the uses of 
hós clauses and not of tís clauses, we leave unexplained this problem. 
 
4.2 Type-shifting rules 
There is another type-mismatch that we must address here. A Free Relative like 
hà hupiskhnoũnto in [9] is not a proposition. For it to be of the right type, it must 
shift its type.19 
According to Jacobson (1995: 466-467), Free Relatives are of type <e, t>. 
They can undergo a type-shifting down that maps them into an individual (type e). 
But it does not suffice to say that, because from e to <s, t>, the route is long. That 
is why I propose to use Pustejovsky’s (1993) notion of type-coercion that would 
change the category of an individual to the category of a proposition. I am aware 
that it may be too large a difference. The following approach may then be better. 
If we follow Nathan’s (2005) concealed question approach after know, as in 
[37], the process he proposed is to start with a predicate. This predicate shifts to a 
set of propositions [38], and in this set, a proposition is singled out by the D [39]. 
 
[37] I know the time. 
 
[38] λP<s <e, t>> .λp<s, t>.[∃xe.p = λws.P (w) (x)]   <s <e, t>> → <<s, t>, t> 
 
[39] [[the]] = λQ<<s, t>, t>.ιp<s, t>.[Q(p) = 1]    (cf. [[the]] = λP<e, t>.ιxe.[P(x) = 1]) 
 
To adopt this approach, we must check whether concealed questions exist in 
Classical Greek. They do, as in [40] shows. 
 
[40] Πάντας ὑµᾶς εἰδέναι νοµίζω τὸν τρόπον 
 
Pántas humãs eidénai nomízō tòn trópon 
 all you know-INF thing-PRS.1SG the manner 
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 Note that what follows is probably peculiar to Classical Greek, where hós Free Relative 
clauses differ in no respect with regard to classical restrictive relative clauses. See footnote 1. 
  
καὶ τὴν ἀσέλγειαν καὶ τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν τοῦ βίου.20 
 
kaì tḕn asélgeian kaì tḕn huperēfanían toũ bíou 
 and the arrogance and the superciliousness the life-GÉN 
 ‘I suppose you all know his way of life, his arrogance and his superciliousness.’ 
 
Another, here more important, problem we run into if we accept Nathan’s 
proposal is that it rests on the Karttunen semantics for questions. Fortunately it 
can be translated into Groenendijk and Stokhof’s semantics for questions, as in 
[41], the G&S’s version of [38]. 
 
[41]  λP<s <e, t>>.λws.λws’.[∃xe.P (w) (x) = P (w’) (x)]   <s <e, t>> → <s <s, t>> 
 
Why is this proposal a little more attractive than mine ? Because it matches 
the recent proposal regarding Free Relatives, that they may be DPs (Caponigro 
(2003), Hinterwimmer (2008)). 
If we take Free Relatives as CPs that have an empty argument (that is a 
property, once more), they must first rise to an individual and then to a 
proposition, since we do not have a D that is going to make the job of singling out 
an individual. One argument in favor of this last approach is that it is syntactically 
more economical.  
 
But for the time being, let us remain agnostic with respect to the matter and 
state that it is at least for sure that we must go through two steps. This is of lesser 
importance which one is the first. One step aims to reach the individual reading, 
the other the proposition reading. 
5 Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have showed that the maxim “what you see is what you get” can 
provide fine outcomes. Classical Greek has two series of unspecified clauses that 
it can use after verbs like know. Their distribution is not random. It can be 
accounted for in terms of nonveridicality: hós clauses are presuppositional. They 
show up only in veridical contexts or are interpreted above a nonveridical 
operator. On the other hand, tís-clauses are licensed only in the scope of a 
nonveridical operator or as a new/focussed item. 
But this is not the whole story, since hós clauses as such cannot be 
interpreted directly after verbs like know, otherwise the composition would result 
in a type mismatch and such sentences would be ruled out. It must undergo a 
double process of individualization and propositionalization. 
This study leads us to exactly the same outcome as Nathan’s (2005), where 
he shows that the concealed question phenomenon is a matter of know class of 
question-embedding verbs. That is “a predicate can embed a concealed question if 
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 Demosthenes, 21, 137. 
 and only if it can embed a proposition” (p. 290). This is tantamount to saying that 
concealed questions are in fact concealed propositions: “we can interpret CQs as 
identity propositions instead of identity questions, and since know can compose 
semantically with a proposition and wonder cannot, we thereby encode both the 
limited meaning of CQs and the correlation between CQs and propositions as 
complements.” This result is perfectly in lines with ours. One can avoid 
interpreting hós clauses as well as so-called concealed questions by means of 
questions. 
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